

A Note on the Complexity of P -Matrix LCP and Computing an Equilibrium

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Abstract. It is proved that if it is NP-hard to solve the linear complementarity problem with P -matrix or to compute a Nash-equilibrium point in a 2-player game, then $\text{NP} = \text{coNP}$.

1. Introduction

In this note we are concerned with two problems which are not known to be in the polynomial time class P, but whose NP-hardness implies $\text{NP} = \text{coNP}$. A similar property is shared by the members of the class of polynomial-time local search (PLS) recently introduced in [1]. The problems we consider here are not known even to be in PLS. As pointed out in [2] the class PLS seems to shed some light on the complexity of a special case of the linear complementarity problem (LCP) which is the following problem:

Problem 1.1. [LCP(\mathbf{M}, \mathbf{q})] Given a rational matrix $\mathbf{M} \in R^{n \times n}$ and a rational vector $\mathbf{q} \in R^n$, find vectors $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \in R^n$ such that

$$\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{M}\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{q} \quad , \quad \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \geq \mathbf{0} \quad , \quad \mathbf{x}^T \mathbf{y} = 0 \quad ,$$

or else conclude that no such vectors exist.

The purpose of this note is to prove a result of the type stated in [2], not only for the LCP with a P -matrix (i.e., a matrix \mathbf{M} with positive principal minors), but in a more general setting which includes the problem of computing an equilibrium point in an n -person game. The latter does not seem to be in PLS even though it can be solved by some extensions of Lemke's method. The LCP with a P -matrix is not known to be in PLS [3] since it is not known whether a P -matrix can be recognized in polynomial time.

In this note we are concerned only with rational inputs, so the assumption of rationality is henceforth omitted. In Section 2 we consider the LCP with P -matrix and in Section 3 the problem of computing an equilibrium point of an n -player game.

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2. The LCP with a P -matrix

It is well-known that $\text{LCP}(\mathbf{M}, \mathbf{q})$ has a unique solution for every \mathbf{q} if and only if \mathbf{M} is a P -matrix. Moreover, since the problem can be solved by Lemke's method, the solution is basic and hence has size bounded by a polynomial in terms of the input size. Now, consider the following:

Problem 2.1. [PLCP] Given a P -matrix \mathbf{M} and a vector \mathbf{q} , solve the problem $\text{LCP}(\mathbf{M}, \mathbf{q})$.

Remark 2.2. From the viewpoint of traditional complexity theory, Problem PLCP has a non-standard form in the sense that its input space is restricted. In [1], the set of instances of a PLS problem is assumed to be a polynomial-time recognizable subset of $\{0, 1\}^*$ (the set of all finite 0, 1-strings). Here, an algorithm for PLCP works under the guarantee that \mathbf{M} is a P -matrix. Nonetheless, the notion of NP-hardness is well-defined for problems without the assumption that the set of instances is polynomial-time recognizable. Precisely, a problem L is NP-hard if there exists a polynomial-time algorithm for the satisfiability problem (SAT) which uses an oracle for L , each call to the oracle taking one time unit. A call to the oracle means that a valid input is given to the oracle and the latter returns a valid output. The oracle is not assumed to recognize in polynomial time that the input is valid.

In view of Remark 2.2, it is legitimate to ask whether the problem P-LCP is NP-hard. It is conjectured in [1] that the class PLS is easier than NP since (see Lemma 4 of Section 2 in [1]) if any PLS problem is NP-hard then $\text{NP} = \text{coNP}$. In [2] an attempt is made to rely on this lemma and show that if PLCP is NP-hard then $\text{NP} = \text{coNP}$. However, it is not known whether P -matrices can be recognized in polynomial-time, which is a prerequisite for showing that PLCP is in PLS. (Obviously, the problem of recognizing a P -matrix is in the class coNP .) If this were true, then (as argued in [2]) membership in PLS could be proved from the monotonicity of the homotopy parameter in Lemke's algorithm when the latter is applied to a P -matrix. The proof in [2] involves Lemke's method, ϵ -perturbations and other details which seem necessary for proving membership in PLS.

It turns out that we can prove that NP-hardness of PLCP implies $\text{NP} = \text{coNP}$ without establishing that PLCP is in PLS. First, consider a more general problem where the set of valid instances is the entire $\{0, 1\}^*$:

Problem 2.3. [PLCP*] Given any matrix $\mathbf{M} \in R^{n \times n}$ and a vector $\mathbf{q} \in R^n$, either exhibit a nonpositive principal minor of \mathbf{M} or find a solution (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) of $\text{LCP}(\mathbf{M}, \mathbf{q})$.

We prove a claim which is stronger than the one in [2]:

Proposition 2.4. *If PLCP* is NP-hard then $\text{NP} = \text{coNP}$.*

Proof: First note that problem PLCP* has a polynomial-time nondeterministic algorithm \mathcal{A} . This follows by observing that (i) if the matrix is not a P -matrix then a nonpositive principal minor can be guessed and checked in polynomial time, and (ii) if the matrix is a P -matrix then the LCP has a solution of polynomial size, which can therefore be guessed and checked in polynomial time. Suppose PLCP* is NP-hard, so there is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm \mathcal{B} for SAT which uses an \mathcal{O} oracle for PLCP*. By substituting the nondeterministic \mathcal{A} for \mathcal{O} , we obtain a polynomial-time nondeterministic algorithm for SAT which recognizes both satisfiable and unsatisfiable formulas. This means that SAT is in $\text{NP} \cap \text{coNP}$ and hence $\text{NP} = \text{coNP}$. ■

Corollary 2.5. *If PLCP is NP-hard then $\text{NP} = \text{coNP}$.*

Proof: By definition, if PLCP is NP-hard then so is PLCP* and the claim follows by Proposition 2.3. ■

Note that the problem of recognizing whether a matrix is a P -matrix may be co-NP-complete, and also there may be easy way to prove a matrix is a P -matrix. A polynomial-time nondeterministic algorithm for PLCP* may compute a solution, but in general it would not prove that the matrix is a P -matrix. Only when the problem does have a solution the algorithm proves it is not a P -matrix.

3. Equilibrium points

A 2-player game (in normal form) can be defined as follows. The payoffs to players 1 and 2 are given, respectively, by rational matrices $\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B} \in R^{m \times n}$. Mixed strategies for players 1 and 2 are, respectively, nonnegative vectors $\mathbf{x} \in R^m$ and $\mathbf{y} \in R^n$ such that $\mathbf{e}^T \mathbf{x} = \mathbf{e}^T \mathbf{y} = 1$ (where \mathbf{e} denotes a vector of 1's). A (Nash)-equilibrium point is a pair (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) of mixed strategies for players 1 and 2, respectively, such that for every mixed strategy \mathbf{z} of player 1,

$$\mathbf{x}^T \mathbf{A} \mathbf{y} \geq \mathbf{z}^T \mathbf{A} \mathbf{y}$$

and for every mixed strategy \mathbf{w} of player 2,

$$\mathbf{x}^T \mathbf{B} \mathbf{y} \geq \mathbf{x}^T \mathbf{B} \mathbf{w} .$$

A classic theorem says that every game has an equilibrium point. Now, denote by $\mathbf{M}(R, C)$ a submatrix of a matrix \mathbf{M} corresponding to a set R of row indices and a set C of column indices. Let $K_1 = \{1, \dots, m\}$ and $K_2 = \{1, \dots, n\}$.

Definition 3.1. An equilibrium point (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) is said to be *basic* if there exist subsets $M_i \subseteq L_i \subseteq K_i$ ($i = 1, 2$) such that

- (i) The columns of $\mathbf{A}(L_1, M_2)$ are linearly independent and so are rows of $\mathbf{B}(M_1, L_2)$.
- (ii) For $i \notin M_1$, $x_i = 0$ and for $j \notin M_2$, $y_j = 0$.
- (iii) $\mathbf{A}(L_1, K_2)\mathbf{y} = \lambda \mathbf{e}$ and $\mathbf{A}(K_1 \setminus L_1, K_2)\mathbf{y} \geq \lambda \mathbf{e}$ for some λ .
- (iv) $\mathbf{x}^T \mathbf{B}(K_1, L_2) = \mu \mathbf{e}^T$ and $\mathbf{x}^T \mathbf{B}(K_1, K_2 \setminus L_2)\mathbf{y} \geq \mu \mathbf{e}$, for some μ .

Once the existence of an equilibrium point has been established, standard linear programming arguments imply the existence of a basic equilibrium point. It follows that if the payoffs are rational numbers, then there exists an equilibrium point with numbers of polynomial size. This implies the following:

Proposition 3.2. *There exists a polynomial-time nondeterministic algorithm for computing an equilibrium point for any two-person game with rational payoffs.*

The following is a direct consequence:

Proposition 3.3. *If it is NP-hard to compute an equilibrium point then $\text{NP} = \text{coNP}$.*

Proof: The argument is essentially the same as in Proposition 2.4. If there is a polynomial-time deterministic algorithm for SAT which uses an oracle for equilibrium points, then we can substitute the oracle by a polynomial-time nondeterministic algorithm for an equilibrium point, and we obtain a polynomial-time nondeterministic algorithm for recognizing both satisfiable and unsatisfiable formulas. ■

References

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