Algorithmic Game Theory (Brief Table of Contents)

Introduction, by Nisan/Roughgarden/Tardos/Vazirani. (outline)

Part I: Computing in Games

Chapter 1: Basic Solution Concepts and Computational Issues in Games, by Tardos/Vazirani. (outline)
Chapter 2: Algorithms for Equilibria, by Papadimitriou. (outline)
Chapter 3: Equilibrium Computation for Two-Player Games in Strategic and Extensive Form, by von Stengel. (outline)
Chapter 4: Learning, Regret Minimization, and Equilibria, by Blum/Mansour. (outline)
Chapter 5: Combinatorial Algorithms for Market Equilibria, by Vazirani. (outline)
Chapter 6: Computation of Market Equilibria by Convex Programming, by Codenotti/Varadarajan. (outline)
Chapter 7: Graphical Games, by Kearns. (outline)
Chapter 8: Cryptography and Game Theory, by Dodis/Rabin. (outline)

Part II: Algorithmic Mechanism Design

Chapter 9: Introduction to Mechanism Design (for Computer Scientists), by Nisan. (outline)
Chapter 10: Mechanism Design Without Money, by Schummer/Vohra. (outline)
Chapter 11: Combinatorial Auctions, by Blumrosen/Nisan. (outline)
Chapter 12: Computationally Efficient Approximation Mechanisms, by Lavi. (outline)
Chapter 13: Profit Maximization in Mechanism Design, by Hartline/Karlin. (outline)
Chapter 14: Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design, by Feigenbaum/Schapira/Shenker. (outline)
Chapter 15: Cost Sharing, by Jain/Mahdian. (outline)
Chapter 16: On-line Mechanisms, by Parkes. (outline)
All Part II Outlines

Part III: Quantifying the Inefficiency of Equilibria

Chapter 17: Introduction to the Inefficiency of Equillibria, by Roughgarden/Tardos. (outline)
Chapter 18: Routing Games, by Roughgarden. (outline)
Chapter 19: Network Formation Games, by Tardos and Wexler. (outline)
Chapter 20: Selfish Load Balancing, by Voecking. (outline)
Chapter 21: The Price of Anarchy and the Design of Scalable Resource Allocation Mechanisms, by Johari. (outline)
All Part III Outlines

Part IV: Additional Topics

Chapter 22: Incentives and Pricing in Communication Networks, by Ozdaglar/Srikant. (outline)
Chapter 23: Incentives in Peer-to-Peer Systems, by Babaioff/Chuang/Feldman. (outline)
Chapter 24: Cascading Behavior in Networks: Algorithmic and Economic Issues, by Kleinberg. (outline)
Chapter 25: Incentives and Information Security, by Anderson/Moore/Nagaraja/Ozment. (outline)
Chapter 26: Computational Aspects of Information Markets, by Pennock/Sami. (outline)
Chapter 27: Manipulation-Resistant Reputation Systems, by Friedman/Resnick/Sami. (outline)
Chapter 28: Sponsored Search Auctions, by Lahaie/Pennock/Saberi/Vohra. (outline)
Chapter 29: Computational Evolutionary Game Theory, by Suri. (outline)