CS269I: Exercise Set #6
Due by 11:59 PM on Wednesday, November 7, 2018

Instructions:

(1) You can work individually or in a pair. If you work in a pair, the two of you should submit a single write-up.

(2) Submission instructions: We are using Gradescope for the homework submissions. Go to www.gradescope.com to either login or create a new account. Use the course code MZZ2BV to register for CS269I. Only one person needs to submit the assignment. When submitting, please remember to add your partner’s name (if any) in Gradescope.

(3) Please type your solutions if possible. We encourage you to use the LaTeX template provided on the course home page.

(4) Write convincingly but not excessively. You should be able to fit all of your solutions into two pages, if not less.

(5) Except where otherwise noted, you may refer to the course lecture notes and the specific supplementary readings listed on the course Web page only.

(6) You can discuss the exercises verbally at a high level with other groups. And of course, you are encouraged to contact the course staff (via Piazza or office hours) for additional help.

(7) If you discuss solution approaches with anyone outside of your group, you must list their names on the front page of your write-up.

(8) No late assignments will be accepted, but we will drop your lowest exercise set score.

Lecture 11 Exercises

Exercise 22
Consider a two-player game in which Alice chooses either action A or action B, and Bob chooses either action C or action D. An outcome (X, Y) of the game (where X ∈ {A, B} and Y ∈ {C, D}) is a Nash equilibrium if each player is playing a best response to the other. In other words, neither player can increase his or her payoff by unilaterally switching strategies. Give an example of a game (with two players with two actions each) that does not have any Nash equilibria.

Exercise 23
Now suppose that a game (with two players with two actions each) is played N ≥ 2 times (where both players know N). The final payoff to a player is defined as the sum of the payoffs earned in the N “stage games.” A strategy is now a (deterministic) function that takes as input the history-so-far (i.e., the actions taken by both players in the first i stages) and returns an action to play in the next stage. A Nash equilibrium is now defined as a strategy pair (one for Alice, one for Bob) such that each player’s strategy is a best response to

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1 For simplicity, we’re disallowing randomized strategies. What we’re calling a Nash equilibrium is usually called a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, to emphasize that each player deterministically chooses an action.

2 If randomized strategies are allowed, then every game (with any finite number of players and strategies) has at least one Nash equilibrium. (This is what Nash proved, back in 1950.)
that of the other (i.e., no other strategy nets larger total payoff against the other’s strategy). Prove that if \((X, Y)\) is a Nash equilibrium in the stage game, then the following is a Nash equilibrium in the repeated game: Alice always plays \(X\), and Bob always plays \(Y\).

Exercise 24

Show by example that a repeated game can have a Nash equilibrium in which the actions chosen by the players in the first stage do not constitute a Nash equilibrium of the stage game. (Two players, two actions each, and \(N = 2\) suffices.)

Exercise 25

Recall the payoff matrix from lecture for the Prisoner’s Dilemma:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cooperate</th>
<th>Defect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperate</td>
<td>2, 2</td>
<td>−1, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defect</td>
<td>3, −1</td>
<td>0, 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Recall the Tit-for-Tat strategy: at stage 1, cooperate; at stage \(i\), do whatever the other player did in stage \(i − 1\). Prove that the Tit-for-Tat strategy never wins a head-to-head match: no matter what strategy Bob uses, if Alice uses Tit-for-Tat, then Alice’s total payoff is at most that of Bob’s.

Lecture 12 Exercises

Exercise 26

Spend some quality time with the Bitcoin blockchain (e.g., at https://www.blocktrail.com/BTC, or a similar site of your choosing). Report on your findings. Describe anything you found interesting, surprising, or mysterious.